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‘The	 historical	 trait	 should	 not	 be	 founded	 on	 a	 philosophy	 of	 history,	 but	
dismantled,	beginning	with	the	things	it	produced.’1	
	
It	is	a	commonplace	that	the	past	two	decades	have	been	marked	by	a	resurgence	
of	 interest	 in	the	history	of	 international	 law.2		Whether	or	not	this	may	warrant	
the	grandiose	 title	of	a	 ‘turn	 to	history’,	 it	 is	a	departure	which	might	prompt	a	
certain	level	of	theoretical	reflection:	why	this	sudden	interest	in	the	historical	at	
the	expense	of	other	 forms	of	analytical	or	critical	endeavours?	What	might	 the	
causes	be?		What	theoretical	or	intellectual	frames	have	opened	up,	that	were	not	
otherwise	 available?	 	 How	 might	 it	 relate	 to	 the	 themes,	 interests,	 or	 pre-
occupations	of	mainstream	international	legal	thought	up	until	that	time?		Whilst	
these	 are	 undoubtedly	 interesting	 and	 important	 questions,	 they	 pose,	 in	 turn,	
two	more	general	questions	as	to	the	relationship	between	theory	and	history	in	
international	 legal	 discourse.	 	One	of	 these,	 of	 course,	 concerns	 the	 theoretical	
and	methodological	conditions	underpinning	the	representation	of	something	as	
the	past	of	 international	 law:	what	 is	 the	 relationship	between	the	text	and	the	
past?	 How	 might	 one	 understand	 the	 act	 of	 ‘representation’?	 	 What	 kind	 of	
international	 law	 is	 being	 represented?	 If	 such	 questions	 are	 concerned	 with	
placing	‘history’	within	the	ambit	of	theory,	it	is	also	clear	that	one	must	attend	to	
the	 historical	 (and	 spatial!)	 specificity	 of	 the	 theoretical	 and	 methodological	
analytics	through	which	that	history	 is	enunciated	or	disclosed.3		What	serves	as																																																									
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‘history’	at	any	one	moment—including	its	boundaries	and	conditions	—	also	has	
its	historical	place.	
	
With	such	thoughts	 in	mind,	 I	want	to	try	to	do	two	things	 in	this	essay.	 	 In	the	
first	place,	I	intend	to	look	back	beyond	the	immediate	causes	and	explanations	of	
the	recent	turn	to	history,	and	focus	instead	upon	their	more	general	conditions	
of	possibility:	what	was	required	in	order	for	the	productive	representation	of	the	
past	of	international	law	as	‘history’	to	be	a	meaningful	activity?	This	might	appear	
a	somewhat	abstruse	question	were	it	not	for	the	fact	that	one	may	specify	with	
considerable	precision	the	moment	at	which	the	law	of	nations	was	to	acquire	an	
historical	 hue,	 requiring	 its	 discourse	 and	 practice	 to	 be	 organized	 in	 temporal	
terms,	and	its	past	‘found’	or	‘uncovered’.	The	significance	of	this,	I	argue,	is	not	
merely	 confined	 to	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 publicists	 and	 jurists	 suddenly	
became	interested	in	the	past	in	a	way	that	wasn’t	apparent	before,	but	that	this	
historical	 consciousness	 fundamentally	 re-shaped	 the	 conceptualization	of	what	
was	 to	 become	 known	 as	 ‘international	 law’,	 and	 placed	 at	 centre-stage	 the	
problem	of	historical	method.		In	the	second	place,	and	following	from	this,	I	want	
to	suggest	that	not	only	did	the	emergence	of	this	historical	consciousness	have	
specifiable	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 dimensions,	 but	 that	 it	 would	 become,	 as	
Foucault	 puts	 it,	 a	 ‘privileged	 and	 dangerous’	 site,	 both	 providing	 theoretical	
sustenance	to	the	discipline,	and	a	space	for	critical	engagement.		I	will	conclude	
with	certain	reflections	upon	problems	of	method	associated	with	contemporary	
critical	international	legal	history.	
	
1.	Turning	to	History	
1795.	 Robert	 Plummer	 Ward,	 a	 British	 author	 and	 politician	 publishes,	 with	
encouragement	 from	Lord	Stowell4,	what	he	proclaims	to	be	the	 first	history	of	
the	law	of	nations	ever	written:	An	Enquiry	into	the	Foundation	and	History	of	the	
																																																								4	Then	a	judge	at	the	consistory	court	and	advocate-general,	later		additionally		appointed	judge	at	the	high	court	of	admiralty.	
		
Law	of	Nations.5		His	claim	may	be	doubted,	given	the	earlier	accounts	provided	by	
de	Martens6	and	 Ompteda	 in	 17857	and,	 indeed,	 of	Moser	 in	 1764.8	But	 there	 is	
little	 doubt	 that	 there	 was	 something	 inaugural	 about	 this	 late	 18th	 Century	
moment	in	the	sense	that	from	that	time	onwards	all	 international	lawyers	were	
compelled	to	conceive	of	their	subject	matter	as	‘being	in	time’	and	as	possessed	
of	‘a	history’.	Not	only	would	the	historical	account	become	an	important	literary	
genre	 in	 the	 19th	 Century	 (from	Wheaton9	through	 to	 Nys10)	 but	 every	 general	
textbook	on	the	subject	of	international	law	would,	almost	by	compulsion,	begin	
with	 an	 historical	 account	 of	 one	 form	 or	 another.	 	 And	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 this	
remains	the	model	to	this	day.	
	Ward’s	 account	 itself	 is	 revealing	 enough	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	turn	to	history.	 	He	makes	clear	in	the	preface	to	the	book,	that	it	had	not	been	
his	 original	 intention	 to	write	 a	 book	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations,	 but	
rather	a	treatise	on	diplomatic	law	–	an	account	of	sovereignty	and	of	the	rights	
and	privileges	of	ambassadors.11		Having	collected	the	relevant	materials,	he	tells	
us,	 he	was	 then	prompted	 to	 ask	himself	 as	 to	 the	 conditions	 ‘under	which	we	
conceive	ourselves	bound	 to	obey	a	 law,	 independent	 of	 those	 resources	which	
the	law	itself	provides	for	 its	own	enforcement’.12	And	at	this	point,	the	limits	of	
his	original	project	soon	became	clear.	 	The	received	answer	to	this	question,	as	
he	understood	it,	was	to	be	found	in	the	Law	of	Nature,	the	content	of	which	was	
to	be	found	in	the	universal	injunctions	of	‘heart	and	natural	conscience’.		Yet,	to	
him,	this	was	unsatisfactory:	
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‘[w]hen	I	considered	how	difficult	it	was	for	the	whole	of	mankind	to	arrive	
at	the	same	ideas	of	moral	good,	from	the	prejudices	of	education	and	habit,	
in	the	different	stages	of	society	 in	which	they	might	be;	more	particularly	
when	 I	 recollected	 the	 great	 difference	 of	 opinion	 there	was	 among	 very	
learned	men,	of	the	same	nations	and	ages,	and	who	had	the	same	sort	of	
education	concerning	the	law	of	Nature	itself;	I	was	still	more	staggered	in	
my	belief	 that	all	 the	world	were	bound	 to	obey	 the	 ramified	and	definite	
scheme	of	duties	called	the	Law	of	nations.’13	
He	continued	by	observing	that:	
‘although	 I	myself	could	make	out	 the	obligation	of	 the	Law	of	Nations	as	
laid	 down	 in	 the	 European	 Codes,	 and	 that	 others	 of	 the	 same	 class	 of	
nations,	and	the	same	religion	with	myself,	could,	and	were	bound	to	do	so	
too;	yet	that	the	law	was	not	obligatory	upon	persons	who	had	never	been	
called	upon	to	decide	upon	 its	ramifications;	who	might	widely	differ	as	to	
its	 application,	 and	even	 as	 to	 its	 general	 and	 fundamental	 principles.	 The	
history	 of	 mankind	 confirmed	 to	 me	 that	 there	 was	 such	 a	 difference	 in	
almost	 all	 its	 extent;	 that	 men	 had	 the	 most	 opposite	 opinions	 of	 their	
duties	towards	one	another,	if	not	in	the	great	outline	and	first	principles	of	
those	duties,	yet	most	certainly	in	the	application	of	them;	and	that	this	was	
occasioned	 by	 the	 varieties	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 moral	 systems	 which	
governed	them,	operated	upon	also	by	important	local	circumstances	which	
are	often	of	such	consequence	in	their	direction.’14	
It	was,	 thus,	no	 longer	plausible	for	him	to	write	a	treatise	on	diplomatic	 law	of	
universal	application.		Rather,	his	attention	was	drawn	towards	writing	a	‘history	
of	the	people	of	Europe’,	not	in	the	‘old’	sense	as	he	puts	it	of	enquiring	into	their	
general	manners,	customs,	politics,	arts,	or	feats	of	arms,	but	in	order	to	discern	
the	maxims	which	governed	 their	 intercourse	with	one	another.	 	 It	was	 to	be	a	
history,	in	other	words,	of	a	distinctively	European	law	of	nations.	
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Leaving	 aside,	 for	 a	 moment,	 the	 operative	 conditions	 under	 which	 this	
historicised	account	of	the	law	of	nations	was	to	emerge,	three	general	features	
of	Ward’s	enquiry	stand	out.		In	the	first	place,	it	is	notable	that	his	turn	to	history	
did	not	arrive	as	a	consequence	of	his	scepticism	towards	the	universal	claims	of	
natural	 right,	but	 rather	 the	other	way	 round.	 	 It	was,	 in	part	at	 least,	historical	
enquiry	that	had	 led	Ward	to	a	position	of	 incredulity	 in	respect	of	the	universal	
pretensions	of	natural	law	(his	thesis,	as	he	put	it,	was	‘proved	by	history’15).		The	
natural	 law	 he	 encountered	 was	 not	 in	 its	 own	 right	 alien	 to	 him	 (nor	 indeed	
irrelevant),	but	it	was	his	experience	of	his	own	historical	subjectivity	that	led	him	
to	 the	 realisation	 that	 its	 prescriptions	 could	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 ratio	
scripta	of	a	singular	divine	being	or	of	a	universal	rational	consciousness.		Rather	
they	 appeared	 to	 him	 as	 moral	 and	 religious	 injunctions	 specified	 by	 time	 and	
place,	engendered	in	particular	through	education	and	moral	learning.		If	‘being	in	
time’,	however,	was	an	existential	condition	that	gave	expression	to	Ward’s	sense	
of	his	own	 ‘European’	 identity	 (an	 ‘occidental	prejudice’	as	Nietzsche	put	 it16),	 it	
was	also	the	mode	through	which	that	self-knowledge	could	be	both	unearthed	
and	transmitted.		The	search	for	the	‘origins’	or	‘foundations’	of	the	law	of	nations	
thus	would	not	only	reveal	 its	point	of	 justification	and	temporal	dispersion,	but	
would	also	provide	active	content	of	what	 it	meant	(for	Ward)	to	be	a	 ‘modern’	
European	in	the	late	18th	Century.	History,	in	other	words,	was	not	only	shaped	by,	
but	a	means	of	making	intelligible,	the	social	or	national	contexts	within	which	it	
was	to	be	produced.	
	
In	 the	 second	place,	 and	as	a	 consequence	of	 this,	Ward’s	understanding	of	his	
own	historical	condition	was	one	that	had	not	only	temporal,	but	also	decisively	
spatial,	 connotations.	 	 If	 his	 experience	 of	 history	 was	 one	 that	 placed	 at	 its	
centre	 the	 place	 of	 human	 agency	 in	 the	 propagation	 and	 dissemination	 of	
religious,	 moral	 and	 legal	 insight	 (and	 which,	 furthermore,	 understood	 human	
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agency	 to	 be	 the	 active	 product	 of	 that	 process),	 it	 was	 one	 that	 had	 as	 its	
complement	a	spatial	differentiation	between	the	cultural	field	within	which	this	
was	 to	 take	 place	 (Europe),	 and	 that	 which	 demarcated	 the	 space	 in	 which	
different	 religious,	 moral	 or	 legal	 insights	 might	 hold	 (non-Europe).	 	 Yet	 the	
temporal	and	spatial	articulations	were	related	in	a	more	fundamental	way.		These	
were	not	separate	modes	of	analysis,	but	were	analytically	of	the	same	register	–	
the	distinction	between	Europe	and	non-Europe	being	of	 the	same	character	as	
the	distinction	between	the	present	of	Europe	and	its	own	past.		As	he	was	to	put	
it,	they	are	all	‘foreign	countries’.	
	
In	the	third	place,	Ward	was	conscious	that	the	writing	of	history	was	ultimately	
an	interpretive	activity	governed	by	the	‘bent	of	mind’	of	the	historian	in	bringing	
understanding	 to	 bear	 on	 what	 might	 otherwise	 be	 a	 ‘dry	 series	 of	 events’.	
‘History	may	be	compared’	he	suggests,	in	continuing	his	spatial	theme,	‘to	a	vast	
and	diversified	country,	which	gives	very	different	 sorts	of	pleasure	 to	different	
travellers,	or	to	the	same	traveller	if	he	visits	it	at	different	times’.17	Thus,	from	the	
same	facts,	he	suggests	‘one	has	drawn	a	history	of	man;	another,	of	the	progress	
of	society;	a	third,	of	the	effects	of	climate;	a	fourth,	of	military	achievements;	a	
fifth,	of	laws	in	general;	a	sixth,	of	the	laws	of	a	particular	state’.18		The	‘past’	for	
Ward,	 in	 other	 words,	 was	 a	 vast,	 heterogeneous,	 field	 of	 experience	 within	
which	 one	 could	 identify	 a	 range	 of	 different	 historical	 lineaments	 dependent	
upon	the	field	of	study	with	which	one	is	engaged.		And	his	particular	project	was	
one	of	bringing	into	view	a	history	proper	to	the	law	of	nations	itself,	with	its	own	
temporality,	chronology	and	moments	of	continuity	and	change.	If,	for	Ward,	this	
was	a	chronology	that	began	in	Rome	and	ended	with	Grotius19	(after	which	not	
much	 happened,	 apparently),	 it	 was	 a	 chronology	 conditioned	 by	 an	 ongoing	
process	 of	 disciplinary	 dispersion	 (in	which	 ‘law’	was	 to	 be	 differentiated	 from	
politics,	 economics,	 sociology,	 anthropology	 and	 so	 on),	 the	 ‘truth’	 of	 which	
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would	 be	 disclosed	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 each	 discipline’s	 own	 peculiar	
moment(s)	of	origin.	
	
The	historical	consciousness	 that	Ward	brought	 to	bear	 in	his	account	may	thus	
be	 thought	 to	 have	 three	 key	 features:	 a	 critique	 of	 universal	 metaphysics	 in	
favour	 of	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 conditions	 of	 social	 and	
cultural	production	(of	law,	ethics,	faith	etc);	a	belief	that	each	of	these	orders	of	
knowledge	-	the	temporal	and	the	spatial	-	were	of	the	same	analytical	character;	
and	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 specificity	 of	 international	 legal	 history	 as	 a	 disciplinary	 sub-
field.	Yet,	if	these	are	the	main	methodological	assumptions	that	might	be	said	to	
inform	 the	 content	 of	 his	work,	 they	 are	 also	 assumptions	 that	 have	 a	 bearing	
upon	how	that	work	itself	might	be	received	or	understood.		For,	if	the	history	he	
was	to	narrate	was	a	history	of	a	contingent	historical	consciousness,	it	was	one	
that	 necessarily	 posed	 the	 same	 questions	 of	 itself:	 what	 made	 it	 possible	 for	
Ward	to	write	this	history?		What	was	available	to	him,	in	terms	of	received	forms	
of	knowledge	or	understanding,	that	made	the	writing	of	a	history	of	the	law	of	
nations	 both	 plausible	 and	 necessary?	 My	 contention,	 here,	 is	 that	 Ward	 was	
working	 in	 a	 social	 and	 intellectual	 environment	 in	 which	 ‘history’	 as	 a	 field	 of	
knowledge	and	a	form	of	social	and	political	consciousness,	was	not	only	actively	
changing	 shape,	 but	 organising	 itself	 around	 new	 temporal	 categories	 of	
considerable	significance.			
	
2.		The	Neuzeit	of	Modernity	
In	the	most	obvious	sense,	the	emergence	of	a	new	historical	medium	within	the	
discourse	of	international	law	in	the	early	19thCentury,	may	be	seen	to	align	with	
two,	specifically	European,	historiographical	developments.		On	the	one	side	was	
the	emergence,	of	a	critical,	source-based,	methodology	that	had	its	roots	in	the	
long-standing	 analytics	 of	 erudition	 (concerned	 with	 examining	 the	 veracity	 of	
sources),	 diplomatics	 (the	 textual	 examination	 of	 documents),	 paleology	 (an	
analysis	 of	 antiquities),	 and	 philology	 (concerned	 with	 placing	 a	 text	 within	 its	
		
historical	and	cultural	 context),	 and	which	was	 to	become	the	hallmark	of	early	
19th	 Century	 ‘professional’	 historiography. 20 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 the	
emergence	of	 linear,	progressive,	histories,	 that	were	 to	mark,	 in	particular,	 the	
stadial	 theories	 of	 the	 Scottish	 enlightenment 21 and	 which	 supplanted	 the	
repetitive,	 cyclical,	 or	 providential	 Biblical	 chronology	 that	 characterized	
historiography	until	that	time.22	
	
In	 Koselleck’s	 terms,	 these	 historiographical	 developments	 were	 key	
characteristics	of	what	he	called	the	‘new	time’	(Neuzeit)	of	modernity	that	was	to	
emerge	within	Europe	 in	 the	 ‘saddle	period’	of	 the	 late	 18th	Century,	 the	critical	
features	of	which	being	fourfold:	1)	it	was	a	conception	in	which	‘history	no	longer	
takes	place	 in	time,	but	rather	through	time’;	2)	 in	which	the	future	was	seen	to	
be	radically	‘open’	rather	than	cyclical	or	repetitive;	3)	in	which	the	diversity	of	the	
world	could	be	brought	together	under	the	umbrella	of	a	singular	chronology	(its	
‘non-simultaneous	 simultaneity);	 and	4)	 in	which	 ‘the	doctrine	of	 the	 subjective	
position,	of	historical	perspective	gained	cogency’.23	
	
Each	of	these	characteristics	of	Koselleck’s	analysis	had	particular	consequences	
for	the	construction	of	international	legal	knowledge	over	the	ensuing	century	or	
more.	 	 In	 its	 first	and	most	 immediate	sense,	a	consciousness	of	history	moving	
through	 time	was	 a	development	 that	had	obvious	 significance	 for	purposes	of	
the	 identification	 and	 characterisation	 of	 the	 sources	 of	 international	 law.	 	 The																																																									
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natural	 lawyers	 who	 came	 to	 be	 represented,	 by	 Ward	 and	 his	 successors,	 as	
representatives	of	the	discursive	‘tradition’	of	international	law,	had	worked	with	
a	 remarkably	 limited	 sense	 of	 temporal	 specificity.	 	 Grotius,	 for	 example,	 had	
argued	that:	
‘History	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 subject	 is	 useful	 in	 two	 ways:	 it	 supplies	 both	
illustrations	 and	 judgements.	 The	 illustrations	 have	 greater	 weight	 in	
proportion	as	they	are	taken	from	better	times	and	better	peoples;	thus	we	
have	 preferred	 ancient	 examples,	 Greek	 and	 Roman,	 to	 the	 rest.	 And	
judgements	are	not	 to	be	 slighted,	especially	when	 they	are	 in	agreement	
with	one	another;	for	by	such	statements	the	existence	of	the	law	of	nature,	
as	we	have	said,is	in	a	measure	proved,	and	by	no	other	means,	in	fact,	is	it	
possible	to	establish	the	law	of	nations.’24	
For	 Grotius,	 in	 other	 words,	 history	 was	 a	 flat,	 limitless,	 field	 of	 insight	 that	
imposed	 no	 order,	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 over	 the	marshaling	 of	 relevant	 sources	 of	
authority.		No	sense	of	temporal	proximity	operated	here	as	a	way	of	estimating	
the	 value	 of	 judgment	 and/or	 illustration	 –	 if	 anything,	 authority	 seemed	 to	 be	
associated	with	temporal	distance	(towards	the	 ‘better’	 times	of	Rome)	or	with	
the	 repetitive	 reoccurrence	 of	 the	 same	 (as	 a	 means	 by	 which	 ‘common	
agreement’	might	 be	discerned25).	 If,	 in	 the	 ensuing	 century,	 one	may	note	 the	
subtle	appearance	of	various	historical	and	temporal	themes	(e.g.	 in	Pufendorf’s	
account	of	 the	development	of	natural	 sociability26)	 even	as	 late	as	Vattel,	who	
wrote	 very	 self-consciously	 about	 his	 own	 ‘modern’	 times,	 there	 is	 no	 meter,	
other	 than	 judgement	 of	 necessity	 or	 nature,	 that	 separates	 the	 opinions	 of	
Justinian	or	Cicero	from	those	of	Wolff.27	
																																																									
24H	Grotius	de	Jure	Belli	ac	Pacis(1646)	(Kelsey	trans)	(1925)	Prolegomena	at	26	
25Ibid,	Bk	I,	ch.i,	s.	xii,	1,	2.	
26	For	a	discussion	see	I	Hont	‘The	Language	of	Sociability	and	Commerce:	Samuel	
Pufendorf	and	the	Theoretical	Foundations	of	the	“Four	Stages”	Theory’	in	A	Pagden	(ed)	
The	Languages	of	Political	Theory	in	Early	Modern	Europe	(1987)	at	253	
27E	Vattel	The	Law	of	Nations	(1805)	Preface	at	xiv	(‘I	have	taken	the	greatest	part	of	my	
examples	from	modern	history,	as	most	interesting,	and	to	avoid	repeating	those	which	
Grotius,	Pufendorf,	and	their	commentators,	have	accumulated’).	
		
For	the	jurists	of	the	19th	Century,	the	formerly	a-temporal	field	of	knowledge	and	
reason	was	to	acquire	an	historical	topography	of	its	own.		As	de	Martens	was	to	
put	 it	 in	 1795,	whereas	Grotius	 had	 formerly	 relied	much	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 the	
poets	and	orators	of	Rome,	
‘[the]	 political	 situation	 of	 Europe	 is	 so	much	 changed,	 since	 the	 fifth	
century	 in	 particular,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Christian	 Religion,	 and	 of	
the	hierarchical	system	and	all	its	important	consequences,	the	invention	
of	 gunpowder,	 the	 discovery	 of	 America	 and	 the	 passage	 to	 the	 East	
Indies,	 the	 ever-increasing	 taste	 for	 pomp	 and	 luxury,	 the	 jealous	
ambition	of	 powerful	 states,	 the	multiplication	of	 all	 sorts	 of	 alliances,	
and	the	introduction	of	the	custom	of	sending	Ambassadors	in	ordinary,	
have	had	such	an	influence	in	forming	our	present	law	of	nations,	that,	in	
general,	 it	 is	necessary	to	go	no	further	back	than	the	middle	centuries	
of	the	Christian	Era.	 .	 .	 .	 It	 is,	 then,	 in	the	history	of	Europe	(and	of	the	
states	of	which	 it	 is	composed)	during	the	 last	centuries,	 that	we	must	
look	for	the	existing	law	of	nations.’28	
Immediately,	 this	 was	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 the	 customs	 and	 practices	 of	
European	states,	upon	the	‘positive’	or	‘voluntary’	law	of	nations	as	exemplified	in	
treaties	and	diplomatic	exchanges,	 rather	 than	upon	the	 rationalist	discourse	of	
the	natural	law.		But	it	was	also	to	re-shape	the	way	in	which	the	literary	tradition	
of	natural	law	itself	was	to	be	received.		The	figures	of	Grotius,	Pufendorf,	Vattel	
etc.	 would	 acquire	 a	 new	 vital	 resonance:	 no	 longer	 would	 they	 simply	 be	 the	
most	prominent,	or	wise,	advocates	of	a	universal	metaphysics	(and	represent,	in	
that	 sense,	 a	 textual,	 literary	 tradition	 of	 judgment	 and	 opinion),	 but	 would	
become	 representatives	 of	 a	 definitively	 historical	 tradition	 of	 thought	 and	
practice	 located	 in	both	 time	and	place.	As	 figures,	 they	would	begin	 to	appear	
from	behind	the	veil	of	their	work	–as	advisors,	philosophers,	teachers,	advocates	
–	engaged	in	specified	diplomatic,	legal	and	political	activity,	arguing	with	greater	
																																																								
28	De	Martens,	above	n.	6	at	6	
		
or	 lesser	 distinction	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 or	 content	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations.29	Their	
work,	 furthermore,	would	 no	 longer	 be	 valued	merely	 in	 terms	of	 its	 precision,	
rigour,	 or	 exhaustive	 character,	 but	 by	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 spoke	 to	 a	
contemporary	 moral	 or	 political	 consciousness	 that	 was	 aware	 of	 its	 own	
historical	 place.	 	 The	 historicist	 alignment	 of	 judgment	 and	 social	 context	 that	
informed	this,	was	to	add	a	new	evaluative	element	to	all	 the	standard	themes:	
the	 enslavement	 of	 enemies,	 claims	 to	 territory	 by	 way	 of	 papal	 grant,	 or	 the	
pursuit	of	‘just	wars’	were	questions	that	could	no	longer	be	answered	simply	in	
terms	of	ideas	of	abstract	justice,	but	in	terms	that	recognized	both	the	historical	
relativity	of	ethical	judgment	and	the	changing	character	of	the	social	and	political	
field	within	which	they	were	to	operate.	
	
In	the	second	place,	if	international	law	was	to	discover	its	new	tradition,	so	also	
was	 it	 to	 discover	 new	 temporal	 categories.	 	 The	 ‘present’	 would	 emerge,	 no	
longer	 being	 a	 ‘moment	 of	 profound	 forgetfulness’,30	but	 as	 the	 measure	 by	
which	 the	past	was	 to	be	 revealed	and	analysed.	Categories	of	 legal	knowledge	
would	gain	or	lose	significance	for	the	commentator	now	critically	aware	of	their	
own	 surroundings.	 	 New	 questions	 would	 appear	 (‘recognition’,	 ‘intervention’,	
control	 over	 the	 use	 of	 weaponry)	 and	 old	 ones	 be	 displaced	 (e.g.:	 marriage,	
procreation,	 education,	 or	 filial	 duty).	 	 New	 distinctions	 would	 also	 emerge	 –	
between	‘international’	and	‘national’,31	between	public	and	private,	between	law	
and	political	 economy.	 	Only	now	would	 it	become	plausible	 to	 talk	about	 legal	
																																																								
29	See	e.g.:	Nippold	‘Introduction’	to	C	Wolff	Jus	GentiumMethodoScientifica	(Drake	trans)	
(1934)	xxvii	(‘If	we	would	realize	the	significance	of	Wolff	to	his	own	age,	and	perhaps	
beyond	that	even	to	our	own,	we	must	needs	pay	attention	above	all	else	to	the	course	
of	his	life.		Only	from	the	coign	of	vantage	which	a	knowledge	of	his	biography	supplies	
can	we	fully	appreciate	what	we	owe	to	this	man	or	obtain	the	cultural	and	historical	
background	upon	which	the	scenes	of	the	work	of	this	philosopher	are	projected,	and	
against	which	the	figure	of	Wolff	is	thrown	in	extraordinary	relief.’)	
30	M	Foucault	Society	Must	be	Defended	(Macey	trans)	(2003)	at	228	
31	See	e.g.:	H	Lauterpacht	introduction	to	C	Bynkershoek	Questionem	Juris	Publici	Duo	
(Franck	trans)	(1930)	xl-xli	(‘he	disdains	the	important	demarcation	between	international	
and	national	public	law	and	freely	intermingles	questions	of	real	international	relations	
with	those	which	only	concern	the	constitution	of	his	own	country	and	are	ruled	by	
national	laws	and	customs’)	
		
change,	 or	 evaluate	 arguments	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 contemporary	 needs	 or	
interests	of	states	or	societies.		The	future,	furthermore,	would	also	appear	to	be	
radically	 open:	 a	 temporal	 category	 towards	which	 energies	might	 be	 invested	
(towards	 liberty,	 justice,	 and	 perpetual	 peace	 and	 away	 from	 despotism,	
absolutism,	 and	 war)	 and	 around	 which	 intellectual	 and	 practical	 projects,	
programmes	and	policies	might	gain	their	measure	and	purpose.32	If	the	theme	of	
‘self-perfection’	 that	 had	 run	 through	 the	 work	 of	 both	 Wolff	 and	 Vattel,	 had	
already	 opened	 out	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 Telos	 of	 social	 and	 political	 organization	 (the	
procuring	of	the	necessities	of	life,	of	peace,	security	and	well-being),	it	was	in	the	
19th	 Century	 that	 identifiable	 nascent	 ‘futures’—civilization,	 secularism,	
humanitarianism	 and	 internationalism—were	 to	 become	 the	 organizing	
categories	of	international	legal	thought,	and	provide	the	conditions	for	thinking	
about	international	law	in	terms	of	its	infinite	progress,	development	or	fruition.	
	
Thirdly,	 if	 ideas	of	 law	and	justice	were	temporally	conditioned,	so	also,	as	Ward	
had	intuited,	were	they	spatially	determined.	Just	as	the	‘present’	of	international	
law,	was	to	be	discovered	through	an	analytic	that	evoked	and	distinguished	past	
or	future,	so	also	did	the	‘worldliness’	of	abstract	historical	knowledge	necessarily	
bring	into	view	the	diverse	conditions	and	experiences	of	people	in	different	parts	
of	the	globe.33		As	Koselleck	puts	it:	
‘With	 the	 opening	 up	 of	 the	 world,	 the	 most	 different	 but	 coexisting	
cultural	 levels	were	brought	 into	view	spatially	and,	by	way	of	synchronic	
comparison,	were	diachronically	classified.	 	World	history	became	for	the	
first	time	empirically	redeemable;	however,	it	was	only	interpretable	to	the	
extent	 that	 the	most	differentiated	 levels	of	development,	 decelerations	
and	 accelerations	 of	 temporal	 courses	 in	 various	 countries,	 social	 strata,	
																																																								
32	K	Marx	Eighteenth	Brumaire	(1852)	(‘The	social	revolution	of	the	nineteenth	century	
cannot	take	its	poetry	from	the	past	but	only	from	the	future’)	
33D	Chakrabarty	Provincializing	Europe	(2000)	7	(‘Historicism	.	.	.	posited	historical	time	as	
a	measure	of	the	cultural	distance	(at	least	in	institutional	development)	that	was	
assumed	to	exist	between	the	West	and	the	non-West’)	
		
classes,	or	areas	were	at	the	same	time	necessarily	reduced	to	a	common	
denominator.’34	
If	the	subsequent	19th	Century	treatises	organized	themselves	around	the	theme	
of	the	emergence	of	a	European	society	of	nation	states,	they	typically	did	so	by	
way	of	bringing	the	differentiated	temporalities	of	a	non-European	world	within	a	
unified	historical	frame	through	their	assimilation	into	European	civilisation’s	pre-
modern	past.		Just	as	the	conditions	of	savage	existence	elsewhere	in	the	world,	
as	 Locke	 had	 already	 intimated,	 provided	 immediate	 access	 to	 the	 historic	
underpinnings	 of	 civilised	 European	 society,	 so	 also	were	 19th	 Century	 jurists	 to	
recognize	the	conditions	of	savage	or	barbaric	existence	elsewhere	as	being	open	
to	 the	 possibility	 of	 maturation	 and	 change,	 and	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 legal	
subjectivity	(of	their	 ‘entry	 into	history’	as	Hegel	was	to	put	 it).	 	This,	of	course,	
was	 to	 lend	 itself	 to	 a	 new	 rationality	 of	 imperial	 rule	 -	 the	 production	 of	
civilization	 through	 beneficent	 colonization,	 and	 to	 the	 organization	 of	 legal	
knowledge	 around	 those	 categories	 (from	 the	 conduct	 of	 warfare	 through	 to	
territorial	 title	 and	 statehood). 35 	It	 was	 also	 to	 survive	 in	 the	 diachronic	
organization	 of	 economic	 thought	 and	 practice	 that	 we	 now	 encounter	 in	 the	
term	‘development’	or	‘developing	state’.36	
	
Finally,	if,	as	Kosseleck	notes,	the	Neuzeit	was	to	focus	attention	upon	perspective	
and	 standpoint–upon,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 the	 social	 and	 intellectual	
framework	that	undergirded	the	production	of	the	literature	of	history	itself–not	
only	 would	 history	 be	 always	 organized	 around	 the	 present	 (requiring	 it	 to	 be	
persistently	re-written),	but	it	would	also	be	indefinitely	plural.		The	differentiated	
temporalities	that	marked	the	geographic	orientation	of	worldly	knowledge,	were	
therefore	matched	by	a	simultaneous	disciplinary	dispersion.	If	nature	had	its	own	
rhythm,	production	its	phases	of	development,	capital	its	modes	of	accumulation,	
prices	 their	 own	 laws	 of	 fluctuation	 and	 change,	 and	 languages	 a	 chronology																																																									
34	R	Koselleck,above	n.	22	at	166	
35	See	A		Anghie	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(2005)	
36S	Pahuja	Decolonising	International	Law:	Development,	Economic	Growth	and	the	Politics	
of	Universality	(2011)	
		
associated	with	their	own	particular	coherence,37	so	also	would	the	law	of	nations	
have	 its	 own	 history,	 and	 one	 that	 would	 be	 distinct,	 as	 Ward	 noted,	 from	
political,	economic,	social	or	cultural	history.		International	legal	history,	thus,	was	
always	to	be	understood	 in	terms	of	 its	own	generative	specificity,	with	 its	own	
moments	of	 inauguration	and	change,	departures	and	dispersals.	 	The	pursuit	of	
its	‘origin’	would	become	an	important	pre-requisite:	as	being	that	which	enabled	
its	 capture	 as	 a	 unified	 and	 continuous	 historical	 phenomenon,	 and	 which	
disclosed,	at	the	same	moment,	its	fundamental	essence.		
	
This	was,	by	no	means,	 to	 resolve	 itself	 in	a	uniform	historiography,	but	was	 to	
bring	to	the	forefront	two	dynamics.		In	the	first	place,	it	would	be	conditioned	by	
the	 simultaneous	 excision	 of	 things	 impure	 (politics,	 ethics,	 sociology,	
anthropology,	 economics	 etc),	 and	 their	 reintroduction	 in	 the	 field	 of	 legal	
knowledge	as	background	conditions.	 	History,	 in	other	words,	would	always	be	
written	by	reference	to	a	sense	of	law’s	boundaries,	or	of	its	specificity	in	relation	
to	 other	 fields	 of	 knowledge	 and	 practice:38	doctrinal	 accounts	 in	 relation	 to	
ethics,	institutional	or	realist	accounts	in	relation	to	politics,	comparative	accounts	
in	relation	to	anthropology	or	sociology.	
	
In	the	second	place,	the	harmony	that	had	formerly	characterized	the	relationship	
between	 the	 voluntary	 and	 natural	 law	 of	 nations	 was	 broken	 apart,	 and	 a	
situated	ethics	of	international	law	was	to	be	placed	in	a	condition	of	permanent	
struggle	against	the	‘realism’	of	historical	knowledge.		As	Hayden	White	explains,	
historiography	 was	 to	 function	 at	 this	 time	 as	 the	 very	 paradigm	 of	 realistic	
discourse,	 ‘constituting	 an	 image	 of	 a	 current	 social	 praxis	 as	 the	 criterion	 of	
plausibility	by	reference	to	which	any	given	institution,	activity,	thought,	or	even	a	
life	 can	 be	 endowed	 with	 the	 aspect	 of	 “reality”’.39		 History	 operated	 in	 19th	
Century	Europe,	in	other	words,	in	precisely	the	same	way	as	‘God’	or	‘Nature’	had																																																									
37M	Foucault	The	Order	of	Things	(1966)at	401	
38	P	Allott	‘International	Law	and	the	Idea	of	History’	(1999)	1	Journal	of	the	History	of	
International	Law		
39	H	White	The	Content	of	the	Form	(1987)	at	101	
		
in	earlier	centuries.	From	here,	and	as	a	consequence,	doctrine	would	be	opposed	
to	practice,	 realism	pitched	against	 idealism,	the	apologetic	against	the	utopian,	
policy	 against	 law,	 the	 law	 ‘as	 it	 is’	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘as	 it	 should	 be’.	 	 And	 these	
oppositions	would	all	be	internalized	within	a	legal	discourse	that	endeavored	to	
both	situate	itself	within	the	field	of	power	so	described,	but	yet	also	to	transcend	
it.	
	
3.		The	Historiography	of	‘Modern’	International	Law	
If,	in	an	immediate	sense,	the	turn	to	history	at	the	end	of	the	18th	Century	opened	
the	 ground	 for	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 European	 international	 law,	 built	 upon	 the	
(historically	conditioned)	customs	and	practices	of	European	nation	states,40	and	
invested	with	 a	 teleology	 that	 took	 as	 its	 object	 the	 advancement	 of	 freedom,	
humanity,	peace,	and	prosperity,	 it	was	a	consciousness	containing	within	 itself,	
the	conditions	of	 its	own	critique.	 	For	the	very	object	that	international	 lawyers	
took	as	their	task	–	the	creation	of	a	system	of	rules	and	institutions	of	universal	
character	–	was	confronted,	at	every	moment,	by	the	apparent	particularity	of	its	
own	 historical	 emergence.	 If	 this	 was	 not	 immediately	 apparent	 for	 those	
engaged	in	writing	the	histories	of	the	seamless	 ‘expansion’	of	 international	 law	
in	the	19th	and	20th	Centuries,	or	indeed	for	those	concerned	with	the	elaboration	
of	 analytical	 or	 policy-oriented	 discourses	 that	 operated	 within	 historically	
disinterested	 fields	 of	 enquiry,	 it	was	 to	 become	 very	much	more	 so	 for	 those,	
either	mourning	 the	dissolution	of	 the	 European	nomos,41	or	 engaging	with	 the	
processes	of	decolonization.42	
																																																									
40	As	Wheaton	was	to	observe	the	jus	gentium,	was	‘a	particular	law,	applicable	to	a	
distinct	set	or	family	of	nations,	varying	at	different	times	with	the	change	in	religion,	
manners,	government,	and	other	institutions’.	H	Wheaton	Elements	of	International	Law	
(1836)	at	44-45	
41	C	Schmitt	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth	(Ulmen	trans)	(2003)	
42See	e.g.:	R	Anand	New	States	and	International	Law	(1972);	C	Alexandrowicz	
TheEuropean-African	Confrontation:	A	Study	in	Treaty	Making	(1973);	T	Elias	Africa	and	the	
Development	of	International	Law	(1988)		See	generally,	A	Becker	Lorca	‘Eurocentrism	in	
the	History	of	International	Law’	in	Peters	(ed)	Handbook	of	the	History	of	International	
Law	(2012)	1034–?		at1042-50	
		
For	the	new	generation	‘Third	World’	scholars	of	the	1960s	such	as	Anand,	Elias,	
Bedjaoui,	Umozurike	and	Alexandrowicz	the	problem	was	how	to	put	at	centre-
stage	the	concerns	and	interests	of	the	non-European	world	 in	conditions	under	
which	 it	 had	 effectively	 been	 written	 out	 of	 the	 discipline’s	 own	 history.	 The	
response	was	diverse.	For	some,	it	was	to	be	achieved	through	the	(re)discovery	
of	lost	traditions	–	of	those	Asian	or	African	systems	of	international	law	that	pre-
existed	colonial	rule	and	interacted	with	it.43		For	others,	it	was	to	be	achieved	by	
way	of	a	critique	of	the	 ideology	of	19th	Century	 ‘doctrinal	positivism’	which	had	
apparently	 ‘shrunk’	 the	world	 of	 international	 law,	 ignoring	 in	 the	 process,	 the	
empirical	practices	(treaties,	agreements,	diplomatic	exchanges)	that	had	marked	
the	 relationship	between	 the	European	and	non-European	worlds.44		Others	 still	
embraced	 the	 European	 narrative,	 confident	 in	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 functionalist	
analytics	that	envisaged	that	changes	in	the	structure	of	international	law	would	
simply	 ensue	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 changing	 shape	 and	 character	 of	
international	society.45		All	embraced	in	one	form	or	another,	however,	a	belief	in	
the	possibility	of	the	articulation	of	a	universal	history	of	international	law	‘in	the	
wake	 of	 Empire’	 so	 to	 speak,46	whilst	 maintaining	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 same	
formal	commitments	–	to	positive	law	built	upon	custom	and	practice,	to	the	idea	
of	progress,	or	of	law	‘responding’	to	the	common	needs	and	interests	of	nation	
states.	If	the	terms	of	this	new	historiography,	thus,	were	to	provide	new	content	
to	 the	 history	 of	 international	 law,	 they	 did	 so	 largely	 by	 leaving	 intact	 the	
methodological	 precepts	 that	 had	 shaped	 the	 work	 of	 those	 such	 as	 Ward.	
Europe	still	remained,	in	that	sense,	the	‘silent	referent’	of	historical	knowledge.47	
																																																									
43E.g.:	Elias,	ibid;	R	Anand	Asian	States	and	the	Development	of	Universal	International	Law	
(1972).		See	further,	S	Sinha	Legal	Polycentricity	and	International	Law	(1996)	
44C	Alexandrowicz	‘The	Afro-Asian	World	and	the	Law	of	Nations	(Historical	Aspects)’	in	
Hague	Recueil	(1968)	I;	Empirical	and	Doctrinal	Positivism	
45E.g.:	R	Anand	‘The	Influence	of	History	on	the	Literature	of	International	Law’	in	R	
MacDonald	and	Johnston	D	(eds)	The	Structure	and	Process	of	International	Law:	Essays	in	
Legal	Philosophy,	Doctrine	and	Theory	(1983)	at	341			
46N	Berman	‘In	the	Wake	of	Empire’	(1998-99)	14	American	University	International	Law	
Review		at	1515	
47Chakrabarty,	above	n.	33	at	28.		On	Eurocentrism	in	international	legal	history	see	
Koskenniemi	2011,	Becker,	above	n.	42.	
		
In	more	recent	years,	the	problem	of	how	to	write	the	history	of	international	law	
in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 simply	 subsume	 the	 non-European	 periphery	 into	 an	
essentially	European	narrative	of	progress	has	been	a	point	of	constant	attention.		
And	 in	 the	 process,	 such	 histories	 have	 gained	 new	 inflections.	 Some,	 such	 as	
Anghie	and	Becker	have	sought	to	re-inscribe	the	periphery	within	an	account	of	
mainstream	 legal	 thought	 and	practice,	 either	by	 identifying	 it	 as	 the	unspoken	
‘referent’	of	doctrinal	argument	(in	which	the	‘standard	of	civilisation’	 is	seen	to	
invest	 itself	 as	 a	 trope	 within	 the	 deep	 structure	 of	 legal	 doctrine48),	 or	 by	
bringing	 to	 light	 the	 critical	 contribution	 of	 scholars	 from	 the	 periphery	 in	
appropriating	 and	 re-formulating	 key	 features	 of	 the	 discipline.49	Others,	 by	
contrast,	have	sought	to	displace	entirely,	the	centrality	of	European	international	
law	by	emphasising	 the	distinctiveness	of	contrasting	world	views	–	 in	Onuma’s	
terms,	the	Islamocentric	and	Sinocentric	–	in	such	a	way	such	as	to	problematize	
any	simple	account	of	the	‘expansion’	of	international	law,	or	of	its	attainment	of	
a	condition	of	universality.50	
	
If	 the	main	 target	of	 such	accounts	has	been	 the	displacement	or	 avoidance	of	
certain	 facets	 of	 the	 received	 historical	 method	 –	 denying,	 for	 example,	 the	
possibility	of	describing	the	history	of	international	law	in	terms	of	its	triumphal,	
‘progressive’,	 expansion	 from	 core	 to	 periphery	 –	 they	 have,	 at	 the	 same	
moment,	 maintained	 fealty	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 specifiable	 history	 of	
international	 law	 whose	 ‘origins’	 may	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 19th	 Century	 and	
beyond,	and	that	the	central	task	is	one	of	re-describing	that	history	in	a	way	that	
inserts	 the	 excluded	 ‘other’	 back	 into	 that	 story.	 	Whilst,	 in	 other	 words,	 such	
counter-histories	 take	 on,	 as	 Nietzsche	 described	 it,	 a	 ‘critical’	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	
																																																								
48A	Anghie	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(2004)	
49A	Becker	Lorca	‘Universal	International	Law:	Nineteenth-Century	Histories	of	Imposition	
and	Appropriation’	(2010)	51	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	at	475	
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‘monumental’	cast,51	they	do	so	nevertheless	by	leaving	intact	its	basic	structure.	
The	problem	here,	is	not	so	much	a	lack	of	determination	as	to	what	the	content	
of	 international	 legal	history	might	be52	-	whether,	 for	example,	 it	 is	a	history	of	
doctrine	or	practice,	a	history	of	structures	or	processes,	a	history	attentive	to	the	
non-European	 as	 well	 as	 the	 European	 experience53	–	 but	 that	 the	 question	 of	
content,	 in	 this	 case,	 is	not	 independent	of	 the	historical	method	by	which	 that	
content	is	made	legible	or	meaningful.		If	I	am	right	in	observing	that	international	
law	was	to	acquire	 its	specifiable	and	discrete	(disciplinary)	content	through	the	
articulation	of	historical	accounts	of	its	emergence,	then	it	would	seem	to	follow	
that	international	law	is	not	simply	something	that	one	can	examine	through	the	
lens	of	history	as	if	it	were	some	historical	artefact	existing	independently	of	the	
means	 chosen	 by	 which	 it	 is	 to	 be	 represented,	 but	 a	 field	 of	 practice	 whose	
meaning	 and	 significance	 is	 constantly	 organised	 around,	 and	 through	 the	
medium	of,	a	discourse	that	links	present	to	past.	As	such,	the	specification	of	its	
origins	 must	 always	 be	 treated	 as	 an	 act	 of	 intervention	 rather	 than	 one	 of	
discovery	-	even	if,	as	we	shall	see,	it	is	an	act	which	has	its	own	conditions.	
	
In	a	critique	of	what	he	takes	to	be	certain	dominant	assumptions	of	mainstream	
accounts	 (specifically,	 those	 written	 in	 progressive,	 objective	 or	 functionalist	
terms),	 Skouteris	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 essentially	 discursive	 character	 of	
international	 legal	history	and	to	 its	 reducible	priority	of	authorial	agency	 in	 the	
‘production’	of	the	past.		He	forefronts,	in	the	process,	two	ideas.	The	first	is	that	
the	past	itself	is	never	available	to	the	legal	historian	‘as	actual	events’,	but	only	in	
the	 form	 of	 mediated	 representations	 of	 those	 events,	 whether	 as	 official																																																									
51	Nietzsche	identified	three	species	of	history	-	the	monumental,	antiquarian	and	critical	–	
which	served	‘the	living	man’	in	three	different	respects:	‘to	him	as	a	being	who	acts	and	
strives,	as	a	being	who	preserves	and	reveres,	[or]	as	a	being	who	suffers	and	seeks	
deliverance’.	Above,	n.	15at	67.	
52	Carty	observes	acutely	that	‘the	reason	international	legal	history	is	almost	impossible	
to	write	is	that	there	is	no	consensus	on	what	international	law	is’.	A	Carty	‘Doctrine	
Versus	State	Practice’	in	Fassbender	and	Peters	(eds)	Handbook	of	the	History	of	
International	Law	(2012)	972–?	at	974.	
53	For	the	varieties	of	history	see	M	Koskenniemi	in	Fassbender	and	Peters	(eds)	
Handbook	of	the	History	of	International	Law	(2012).	
		
records,	the	work	of	commentators,	or	in	some	other	residual	or	artifactual	form.	
‘History	and	the	past’	as	he	puts	 it,	 ‘are	two	different	things’.54	The	second,	and	
related,	observation	being	that	any	work	of	historical	 reconstruction	will	always	
involve	 acts	 of	 selection	 and	 arrangement	 –	 decisions	 both	 as	 to	what	 is	 to	 be	
represented	 (state	 practice,	 judicial	 decisions	 etc),	 and	 as	 to	 how	 those	 past	
events,	once	 reconstructed,	will	be	organised	and	 related	 to	one	another.55	In	a	
positive	 sense,	 this	draws	attention	 to	what	Hayden	White	 calls	 the	 ‘content	of	
the	 form’,	 bringing	 into	 view	 the	 (ideological)	 role	 of	 aesthetic	 structure	 or	
narrative	organisation	in	the	generation	of	historical	meaning.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	 Skouteris	 notes	 that	 the	 further	 one	 emphasises	 the	 constructed	
character	of	history,	and	the	centrality	of	the	historian	in	its	production,	the	more	
it	 ‘seems	 to	 dissolve	 any	 possible	 ground	 for	 assessing	 the	 historical	 past’	 and	
undermines	 ‘the	 possibility	 of	 performing	 much	 for	 the	 work	 that	 any	 jurist	 is	
expected	 to	 perform	 in	 her	 everyday	 tasks’.56	In	 cutting	 away	 the	 ground	 from	
any	representation	of	the	past	that	seeks	to	‘unveil’	meaning	or	normative	insight	
from	the	mere	fact	of	 its	own	disclosure,	so	also,	he	fears,	 it	seems	to	cut	away	
the	grounds	for	any	kind	of	historical	critique.	
	
Skouteris’s	 concerns,	 here,	 as	 to	 the	 unavailability	 of	 a	 straightforward	
representative	account	of	history	may,	in	some	measure,	misconstrue	the	way	in	
which	the	past	is	conceptualised	within	international	legal	argument.	If	what	is	of	
concern	is	the	way	in	which	ideas	and	events	from	the	past	may	be	redeployed	to	
new	purpose	 in	 the	present,57	then	 the	problem	may	not	be	 that	of	getting	 the	
history	 straight	 so	 much	 as	 understanding	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 certain																																																									
54	T	Skouteris	‘Engaging	History	in	International	Law’	in	Benyeto	and	D	Kennedy	(eds)	
New	Approaches	to	International	Law	(2012)	99–122	at	112.		See	also	Koselleck,	above	n.	
22at	111	(‘the	facticity	of	events	established	ex	post	is	never	identical	with	the	totality	of	
past	circumstances	thought	of	as	formerly	real.		Every	event	historically	established	and	
presented	lives	on	the	fiction	of	actuality:	reality	itself	is	past	and	gone.’)	
55	Ibid,	pp.	113-4.	
56Ibid,	p.	118.	
57	For	an	elegant	statement	of	this	point	see	A	Orford	‘On	International	Legal	Method’	
(2013)	1	London	Review	of	International	Law	166–176.		See	also	A	Orford	‘The	Past	as	Law	
or	History:	The	Relevance	of	Imperialism	for	Modern	International	Law’	NYU	Institute	for	
International	Law	and	Justice	Working	Paper	2012/2.	
		
kinds	of	 history	 appear	 to	make	 themselves	 available	 in	 contemporary	 settings.		
The	past,	it	might	be	said,	only	answers	the	questions	we	pose	of	it,	but	the	kinds	
of	 questions	 we	 might	 ask,	 or	 the	 styles	 of	 analysis	 we	 might	 deploy,	 are	 not	
themselves	limitless.	
	
In	Foucault’s	terms,	this	is	to	recommend	undertaking	an	analysis	of	what	he	calls	
the	 ‘contemporary	 limits	of	the	necessary’.	What	 is	needed	for	that	purpose,	he	
suggests,	 is	 an	 ‘historical	 investigation	 into	 the	 events	 that	 have	 led	 us	 to	
constitute	ourselves	and	to	recognise	ourselves	as	subjects	of	what	we	are	doing,	
thinking,	saying’.58	This	may	be	seen	to	open	out	two	new	avenues	of	thought.		In	
the	 first	 place,	 it	 is	 to	 give	 recognition	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 authorial	 jurist	who	
claims	 to	 exercise	 sovereignty	 over	 the	 literary	 patterning	 of	 the	 past	 of	
international	law,	is	 itself	a	subject	inserted	within	an	(historical)	and	intellectual	
context.	 If	 this	works	upon	Marx’s	 intuition	 that	we	make	our	own	history,	but	
not	in	conditions	of	our	own	choosing,	the	answer	is	not	merely	to	strip	away	all	
superstition	about	 the	past	 (i.e.	 subject	 it	 to	a	critique	of	 ideology),	but	seek	 to	
identify	 and	 specify	 the	 historic	 conditions	 that	 both	 ‘produce’	 the	 field	 of	
professional	 expertise	 that	enables	 international	 lawyers	 to	 imagine	 themselves	
as	interlocutors	within	a	specifiable	discourse	and	practice,	and	which	also	serve	
to	delimit	the	boundaries	of	what	it	is	possible	to	say	or	think	in	that	context.	This	
may	 be	 such	 as	 to	 push	 historiography	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 accounts	 that	 both	
situate	 the	emergence	of	disciplinary	expertise	within	broader	social,	economic,	
cultural	 and	 political	 fields	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 orienting	 it	 towards	 broader	
questions	of	structure	(the	conditioning	place,	for	example,	of	class	and	capital).			
	
In	 the	second	place,	and	 in	a	similar	sense,	 it	pushes	attention	towards	thinking	
about	the	contemporary	world	of	international	law,	not	in	terms	of	a	specified	set	
of	actors	and	agencies,	powers	and	competences,	that	are	already	firmly	grasped	
as	historically	 ‘given’,	but	as	 things	that	are	constantly	 in	 the	condition	of	being	
ushered	 into	existence,	reinforced	and	affirmed.	 If,	as	Lang	points	out,	one	may																																																									
58M	Foucault	‘What	is	Enlightenment?’	(1984)	at	46	
		
understand	 the	 regulatory	 activities	 of	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 WTO	 as	
contributing	to,	and	shaping,	our	social,	political	and	economic	knowledge	of	the	
world	 (within	which	 it	 then	seeks	 to	 insert	 itself),59	so	also	may	one	understand	
the	 regimes	 of	 authority	 that	 structure	 international	 legal	 doctrine	 (states,	
governments,	institutions	etc)	as	simply	that	–	claims	to	authority,	knowledge	and	
truth	 that	pattern	behavior	 through	 the	 repeated	 injunction	 that	we	should	 act	
‘as	if’	they	were	somehow	more	than	that.	History	written	in	this	guise,	is	history	
conscious	always	of	its	own	productive	role	in	making	the	world	appear.	
	
Conclusion	
The	problem	I	have	been	trying	to	put	at	centre	stage	in	the	course	of	this	essay	is	
one	that	 folds	back	upon	 itself:	how	 is	one	to	provide	an	(historical)	account	of	
the	emergence	of	the	category	of	the	historical	within	 international	 law	without	
already	presuming	its	existence?		The	result,	in	a	sense,	is	a	partial,	and	imperfect,	
performance	 of	 that	 which	 I	 am	 seeking	 to	 describe,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 performance	
nevertheless	concerned	with	elucidating	the	consequences	of	a	very	simple	idea:	
everything	has	a	time	and	place.		As	I	have	sketched	it	out,	the	consequences	of	
that	insight	may	be	thought	to	have	taken	two	forms,	or	to	have	operated	in	two	
phases.	 	 In	 the	 first	 of	 these	 the	 agenda	 was	 to	 place	 international	 law	 itself	
within	the	frame	of	history	–	to	historicise	its	normative	conditions,	to	identify	its	
origins,	and	 to	map	out	 its	emergence	and	evolution	over	 time.	 	 If,	 initially,	 this	
was	 to	 gesture	 towards	 the	 dispersion	 of	 things	 in	 space	 (to	 a	 differentiated	
geographical	 legal	 knowledge)	 it	was	nevertheless	 reintegrated	by	means	of	 its	
incorporation	 within	 a	 singular	 chronology.	 	 Development,	 progress,	 evolution	
were	 the	 principal	 watchwords	 of	 this	 spatio-temporal	 conglomerate.	 In	 the	
second	phase,	historical	knowledge	itself	has	become	the	point	of	focus,	in	which	
the	grounds	and	conditions	for	speaking	about	the	past	of	international	law	have	
themselves	opened	up	to	examination	through	the	lens	of	time	and	place.		Here,	
historical	knowledge	is	 insistently	contemporary	and	ideologically	 laden,	capable	
of	producing	insight	and	critique,	but	nevertheless	posing	always	the	problem	of																																																									
59A	Lang	‘The	Legal	Construction	of	Economic	Rationalities’	(2013)	40	JLS	at	155	
		
how	to	grasp	 itself	 in	 its	own	historical	conditions.	 If	the	history	of	 international	
law	today	is	unavoidably	a	history	of	the	present,	one	task	may	be	to	understand	
the	patterns	of	 deployment	 and	 consumption,	 attending	 to	 the	blind-spots	 and	
biases	 in	 contemporary	 accounts,	 yet	 another	 and	 perhaps	 more	 arduous	 task	
may	 be	 to	 understand	 the	 (historic)	 conditions	 that	 delimit	 the	 parameters	 of	
what	may	or	may	not	be	rendered	as	the	past	of	international	law	today.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
